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Intrinsic Motivation, Office Incentives, and Innovation
Tinghua Yu ∗
Abstract
Many organizations, such as government agencies and NGOs, learn about policy
effectiveness through decentralized experimentation. However, unobserved effort by an
agent can affect the outcome of an experiment, thus limiting its informativeness. A
principal can improve the informativeness of an experiment by motivating the agent,
using office as an incentive. I develop a model of office incentives in a decentralized
experimentation setting where agents are motivated by organizational goals. The prin-
cipal may keep the agent in office only when the outcome of an experiment is good,
thereby creating high-powered office incentives for the agent. High-powered office in-
centives motivate the agent’s effort in implementing the experiment in order to stay
in office. However, they also reduce the agent’s expected informational benefits from
experimentation, which can reduce the effort expended by the agent in implementing
the experiment. The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals
affects such trade-offs. I show that the principal is more likely to use high-powered
incentives when the agent places a high value on achieving organizational goals and
when multiple agents implement the same experiment.
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Wolton, Mike Ting, seminar participants at Columbia University Comparative Politics Seminar and Polit-
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MPSA Conference, and the 2015 Annual SPSA Conference. All remaining errors are my own.
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Many organizations, such as government agencies and NGOs, learn through experi-
mentation. Outcomes of experimentation often depend significantly on unobserved effort
decisions made by agents. For instance, if a legislature wants to learn about the efficacy of a
new education program, individual schools decide how much effort to exert in implementing
the experimental program. Similarly, when donors try out a new developmental project,
NGOs that implement the project choose their level of effort in it. In China, experimenta-
tion has decisively shaped the making of policies in many domains, such as economic reform,
inter-party democracy, public education, etc.1 To learn how effective a new policy is, the au-
thority in the central government often experiments with it at the local level.2 Local officials
implement experimental policies, and the outcomes of experiments provide feedback for the
central authority’s future policymaking. An ineffective policy produces bad outcomes. An
effective policy could also produce bad outcomes if agents shirk in implementation. With
the low effort of agents, little could be learned about the efficacy of policy. In such a process,
agents’ unobserved effort limits the informativeness of an experiment.3
To maximize information, principals often use the office itself to motivate the agent
to put effort into an experiment. Because public bureaucracies and NGOs do not offer
much formal bonus pay for performance, using the office as an incentive is crucial to these
organizations. An important component of office value comes from the agent’s preference
1 See Cao, Qian, & Weingast (1999); Fewsmith (2013); Heilmann (2008); Wang (2009); Xu (2011) for
discussion on policy experimentation on various issues.
2 Local-initiated policy experimentation, and center-sponsored experimentation, distinguished by the
source of the policy decision, are the two main types of experimentation at the local level. In a local-
initiated policy experiment, the local officials make the policy decision to experiment. In center-sponsored
experimentation, the central authority imposes experimental policies on the local agents. In both types of
experimentation, local officials are responsible for implementation. Scholars debate about whether a specific
local experiment is local-initiated or center-sponsored (See Cai & Treisman (2006) for more discussion). The
model in the paper helps to understand center-sponsored experimentation.
3 Hirsch (2016) and Chassang, Miquel, & Snowberg (2012) also discuss the implication of agent’s effort
decision for learning in experiments.
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for achieving organizational goals. The agent may intrinsically share organizational goals.4
In the public sector, public service motivation is the major source of intrinsic motivation
(Francois, 2000; Le Grand, 2006; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008). The agent may also identify
with organizational goals other than serving the public good (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005;
Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Sheehan, 1996; Wilson, 1989). In addition, whether an organization
achieves its goal affects its funding and survival. Downs (1967) argues that “No bureau can
survive unless it is continually able to demonstrate that its services are worthwhile to some
group with influence over sufficient resources to keep it alive.” Because the agent’s material
well-being hinges on the organization’s funding and his career on the organization’s survival,
the agent is concerned with achieving organizational goals.
How should the principal use office to motivate the agent in decentralized experimen-
tation? Should she keep the agent in office only when the outcome of an experiment is good,
thereby creating high-power office incentives or should she keep the agent in office regard-
less of the outcome? To address these questions, I develop a formal model to analyze the
principal’s decision of whether to introduce high-powered office incentives in decentralized
experimentation. The principal cares about achieving the organizational goal. When in
office, the agent also has a preference for achieving the organizational goal. A status quo
policy and an experimental policy are available. The effectiveness of the status quo policy
in achieving the organizational goal is known. The effectiveness of the experimental policy
in achieving the organizational goal is unknown ex ante. An effective policy is more likely
to achieve the organizational goal if the agent works harder. An ineffective policy always
fails. To learn about the effectiveness of the experimental policy, the principal chooses the
experimental policy for the agent to implement in the beginning.
4The literature conceptualizes intrinsic motivation in two ways. Some consider that individuals obtain
payoffs only when they are working on the provision of the policy (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Andreoni, 1990).
Others regard intrinsic motivation as a sort of pure altruistic concern that causes individuals to care about
the policy regardless of the policy provider’s identity (Francois, 2000; Gailmard & Patty, 2007). I take the
first approach in this paper.
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The game begins with the principal’s decision of whether to retain the agent only when
the outcome of the experiment is good or to retain the agent unconditionally. The former
type of re-appointment rule creates high-powered office incentives and the latter, low-powered
office incentives. The agent sets a level of effort in implementing the experimental policy.
At the end of the first period, the policy outcome is revealed to all players. According to
the re-appointment rule, the principal retains an agent in office or replaces him with a new
agent who shares the preference in achieving the organizational goal with the sitting agent.
In the second period, learning from the policy experiment, the principal decides whether to
adopt the experimental policy or the status quo policy. An agent in office decides how much
effort to expend in implementing the second-period policy.
One building block of the model is that effort expended by the agent in experimen-
tation in the first period affects information about the experimental policy, which is used
for policymaking in the second period. A higher level of effort provides better information
about the experimental policy. Based on better information, the principal can make better
policy decisions in achieving organizational goals, which benefits both the principal and the
agent in future office. In other words, both the principal and the agent in future office derive
informational benefits from experimentation.
To gain better information, the principal chooses office incentives that motivate the
agent’s effort in experimentation. On the one hand, if the principal adopts high-powered
incentives, the agent may not stay in office. Yet the agent’s effort in experimentation leads
to his informational benefit in the second period only if he stays in office. Higher-power
incentives thus make the agent hold back experimentation effort in the first place. On the
other hand, high-powered incentives may also motivate the agent. To stay in office, the agent
puts effort into experimentation. When the expected payoff of future office is higher, this
motivation effect of high-powered incentives is stronger.
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The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects the prin-
cipal’s trade-offs. When the agent places a low value on achieving organizational goals, the
agent is less motivated to exert effort. With low effort, his chance of staying in office to
reap learning benefits is low. Thus, he is more likely to hold back effort in experimentation
given high-powered incentives. In addition, a lower effort in experimentation leads to a lower
informational benefit in future office and hence a lower total expected payoff in future office.
The motivation effect of high-powered incentives is weaker. Therefore, high-powered incen-
tives are more likely to dampen incentives for the agent who places a low value on achieving
organizational goals. Consequently, the principal refrains from using high-powered incentives
when the agent places a low value on achieving organizational goals.
Decentralized experimentation often involves multiple agents. Take China, for an exam-
ple, where most policy experiments are implemented by local officials in different localities.5
Likewise, American bureaucracies are replete with of examples in which different agencies
or branches within an agency carry out the same task.6 I extend the basic model to incor-
porate a situation with two agents. I contrast the principal’s choice of incentive structures
in a one-agent setting with that in a two-agent setting. In the one-agent environment, only
one agent’s effort matters for policy learning. In the two-agent environment, both agents’
effort contributes to policy learning. If the other agent exerts more effort, an agent’s own
effort becomes less crucial for policy learning, and the marginal informational benefits of
one’s own effort diminish. Balancing the cost of effort and its return at the margin, an agent
is less concerned with not reaping the learning benefit in this case. In addition, if the other
agent exerts more effort, information about an experimental policy improves and an agent’s
future office becomes more valuable. This strengthens the motivation effect of high-powered
incentives. Generally speaking, compared to the one-agent setting, the principal is more
5See footnote 1 and footnote 2.
6For example, Bendor (1985) discusses issues in welfare policy in the 1960s.
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likely to introduce high-powered incentives in the two-agent setting.
This paper contributes to the literature on incentive issues outside a standard private-
sector context (Acemoglu, Kremer, & Mian, 2008; Alesina & Tabellini, 2007; Akerlof &
Kranton, 2005; Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Dixit, 2002; Maskin &
Tirole, 2004). It relates to the policy experimentation literature, specifically the strand
of literature that examines the aspect of career risk involved with policy innovation (Cai &
Treisman, 2009; Cheng & Li, 2015; Majumdar & Mukand, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 1980). The
difference between this paper and that strand of literature is that this paper emphasizes how
unobserved effort affects the experimental outcome. In addition, this paper speaks to the
literature on policy experimentation in federal systems. One focus of the literature is on the
informational externality associated with policy experimentation across regions (Strumpf,
2002; Volden, Ting, & Carpenter, 2008; Callander & Harstad, 2015). Finally, vast literature
discusses learning in the private sector (Keller, Rady, & Cripps, 2005; Bolton & Harris, 1999).
Some research examines learning in a principal-agent setting where agents are motivated by
monetary incentives (Bergemann & Hege, 2005; Bonatti & Hörner, 2011; Halac, Kartik, &
Liu, 2016; Manso, 2011).
Model
Environment and Players
The game takes place over two periods, denoted by t = 1, 2. A principal P makes
a policy choice. Agent A1 and agent A2 implement the policies in their jurisdictions. P
commits to a re-appointment rule which is based on Ai’s policy outcome in period 1. There
are two policy options: a status quo policy, denoted by 0, and an experimental policy,
denoted by 1. To learn about the experimental policy, P chooses the experimental policy in
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the first period. Ai sets an effort level ai1 ∈ [0, 1] in policy experimentation. In period 2,
P chooses a policy p2 ∈ {0, 1}. If Ai is re-appointed, he sets an effort level ai2 ∈ [0, 1] in
implementing policy in period 2. Otherwise, a new appointee implements the policy.
Let xit be the policy outcome in jurisdiction i at period t. If the policy is successful,
it yields an outcome of 1. If it fails, it yields an outcome of 0. The effectiveness of policy
and effort in implementation jointly determine the policy outcome. The effectiveness of an
experimental policy, denoted by θ, is ex ante unknown. It could be θ or θ. Throughout, I
refer to type θ as “ineffective” and type θ as “effective”. All players share common prior
beliefs about θ, where Pr(θ = θ) = 1
2
. If θ = θ, the experimental policy fails. If θ = θ,
with probability ait, the policy succeeds; with probability 1 − ait, the policy fails. When
the status quo policy is implemented, the probability of success is γait. γ thus measures the




].7 At the end
of period t, policy outcome xit is revealed to all players. I summarize the policy outcome as
follows.
If pt = 0, the policy outcome xit is distributed as follows.
xit =

1 with probability γait
0 with probability 1− γait.
(1)
7 When γ ≥ 12 , the ex ante outcome of the experimental policy in the first period is not better than the
outcome of the status quo policy. When γ > 23 , even if the experimental policy is revealed to be effective ex
post, the principal is better off adopting the status quo in the first period. Thus, the lower bound ensures
that the principal undertakes experimentation in the first period to learn about the experimental policy, and
the upper bound ensures that experimenting in the first period is possibly beneficial for the principal in the
long run.
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If pt = 1, the policy outcome xit is distributed as follows.
xit =

1 with probability ait if θ = θ; with probability 0 if θ = θ
0 with probability 1− ait if θ = θ; with probability 1 if θ = θ.
(2)
In the beginning, P commits to a re-appointment rule that specifies a threshold of the
first-period policy outcome, denoted by σ ∈ {0, 1}. Only if xi1 ≥ σ, P re-appoints Ai in
the second period. If σ = 0, P offers low-powered office incentives. If σ = 1, P provides
high-powered office incentives.








Ai cares about policy outcome in his own jurisdiction and receives λxit if he is in office
in period t. λ ∈ [0, 1] thus measures the degree to which Ai is motivated by organizational




If Ai is replaced, a new agent has the same degree of organizational-goal motivation as Ai.
This assumption is to rule out the possibility that P replaces Ai for pure selection reason,
and thus to focus on the moral hazard problem. Ai’s payoff function is
VAi = λxi1 − c(ai1) + Ii(λxi2 − c(ai2)),
where Ii is an indicator function. Ii = 1, if Ai stays in office in period 2; and Ii = 0,
otherwise.
Sequence
This two-period game proceeds as follows.
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1. Nature draws the value of θ.
2. P commits to a re-appointment rule σ.
3. Ai chooses ai1 in period 1.
4. Nature reveals policy outcomes xi1 to P and Ai.
5. P chooses p2.
6. The agent in jurisdiction i in period 2 chooses ai2.
Solution Concept
This game has a component of information revelation, so I derive perfect Bayesian
equilibria in pure strategies. I focus on symmetric equilibrium where both agents adopt
the same strategies. Let H1 be the set of all period 1 histories. The equilibrium consists
of strategies: σ, ait, p2, and beliefs about the experimental policy’s type. σ ∈ {0, 1}.
ai1 : {0, 1} → [0, 1] maps P’s threshold choice onto into Ai’s effort choice in period 1.
p2 : H
1 → {0, 1}maps the set of period 1 history to period 2 policy choice. ai2 : H1×{0, 1} →
[0, 1] maps the set of histories leading to period 2 effort choice to period 2 effort choice in
jurisdiction i. For each history, players also have beliefs about the probabilities of the
experimental policy’s type. All players share the same prior belief, denoted by ρ0. Let ρ1j
be player j’s posterior belief by the end of period 1, where j ∈ {P,A1, A2}.
Results
To show the cost and benefit of high-powered incentives in generating informative
experimentation, I begin with an example of one agent. Then, I consider the case of two
agents. In each case, I first derive players’ strategies in period 2 and describe how effort
in experimentation in period 1 affects decisions in period 2. Then, I analyze the agents’
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strategies in period 1 under different incentive structures. The principal’s choice of incentive
structures is then discussed. Finally, I compare incentive structures in equilibrium across
two cases.
One Agent
In the basic setup, the notations are developed for a two-agent case. Here, I make some
necessary notational changes for a one-agent case. An agent is denoted by A, his effort in
period t by at, policy outcome in period t by xt, P ’s second-period choice by p
s
2, and her
re-appointment rule by σs.
Period 2 Decisions
A key feature of the model is that information available to players in period 2 is
endogenous to effort into experimentation in period 1. Suppose that the agent exerts effort
a1 in period 1 in equilibrium. Players update their beliefs over the experimental policy’s type
using Bayes’ rule.8 If the experiment succeeds, knowing an ineffective policy always fails, all
players infer that the experimental policy is an effective type (ρ1j = 1). If the experiment
fails, it could be caused by an ineffective policy or by insufficient effort. More specifically,











In the case of experimentation failure, the posterior beliefs of all players are less than or
equal to their priors.
Based on the information about the experimental policy, players make second-period
8In the appendix, I show that given any belief that the principal could hold off-equilibrium, the agent
has no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium action.
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decisions. The second-period decisions include the principal’s policy choice p2 and an effort
decision a2 by an agent in office. Because the second period is the last period, the principal
chooses a policy that gives her a higher expected payoff in a single period, and the agent
exerts effort to maximize his single period payoff. Suppose that the principal adopts the
experimental policy in the second period. In this case, an agent in office exerts effort a2 = λρ1
and the resulted expected policy payoff is ρ21λ. If P chooses the status quo policy in the
second period, an agent in office exerts effort a2 = λγ and the expected policy payoff in
the second period is γ2λ. If the posterior belief that the experimental policy is an effective
type is greater than the effectiveness of the status quo policy (ρ1 > γ), the experimental
policy yields a higher policy payoff. This condition holds if and only if the first-period
experiment succeeds. Observing a successful first-period experiment, the principal adopts the
experimental policy in the second period. The following remark summarizes the principal’s
policy choice in the second period.
Remark 1. Given the outcome of policy experimentation in period 1, P ’s period 2 policy
choice in the one-agent setting is as follows.
ps∗2 =

1, if x1 = 1;
0, otherwise.
The Learning Premium
As discussed in the previous section, the principal’s second-period policy decision de-
pends on information revealed through first-period policy experimentation. Here, I show
that policy experimentation is valuable to the principal and the agent who stays in office.
The value of policy experimentation depends on how much effort the agent puts into exper-
imentation.
Given the first-period effort a1 and the prior about the experimental policy, the ex ante
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probability of an experiment being successful is 1
2
a1. By Remark 1, the ex ante probability
of the principal adopting the experimental policy in period 2 is 1
2
a1 and that of choosing the
status quo policy is 1− 1
2





a1(1− γ2) + λγ2. (3)
The term λ1
2
a1(1 − γ2) in the above equation is the principal’s learning premium. It
represents the effect of the agent’s first-period effort in experimentation on the principal’s
second-period payoff. When an experiment fails, the experimental policy is rejected by the
principal in the second period. However, the experimental policy might be effective and the
agent’s shirking causes the failure. As the agent exerts more effort, the probability that an
effective experimental policy is rejected decreases. More effort into experimentation thus
increases the learning premium.
If the agent stays in office in the second period, he also benefits from policy experimen-
tation. In addition to the benefit from a better policy decision by the principal in the second
period, better information about the experimental policy helps A calibrate his effort better.
He works harder for a more effective policy and avoids wasting effort on a less effective policy.










As part of the expected payoff in future office, the learning premium of an agent in














a1λ(1− γ2) + λγ2
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a1(1 − γ2). The higher the degree to which the agent is
motivated by organizational goals, the more he values policy experimentation, and the higher
leaning premium he receives. The more effective the status quo policy, the less valuable the
policy experimentation, and the lower the learning premium.
Low-Powered Office Incentives
First, consider that the principal chooses σs = 0. Regardless of the performance, the
agent stays in office and receives the learning premium in the second period. Expecting







a1 − c(a1) + E(w(a1)).








(1− γ2) = a1. (5)
The right-hand side of the above equation is the marginal cost of effort. The first part
in the left-hand side is the current marginal return. The second part in the left-hand side is
the marginal learning premium. The agent sets an effort level such that the marginal cost
equals the sum of marginal returns in two periods. The following remark summarizes the
agent’s decision in the first period given low-powered incentives.
Remark 2. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σs = 0, effort in experimen-




λ(1 + (1− γ2)λ
2
),
where the superscript denotes that the re-appointment rule provides low-powered office incen-
tives.
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Under a re-appointment rule that provides low-powered office incentives, as the agent
becomes more motivated by organizational goals, his effort in experimentation in period 1
increases; as the status quo policy becomes more effective, the effort decreases. The current
effort leads to better current and future policy outcomes. The stronger the organizational-
goal motivation, the more the agent values policy outcomes, and the more effort the agent
exerts. When the status quo policy is more effective, learning about the experimental policy
becomes less beneficial.
High-Powered Office Incentives
Now, consider that the principal sets σs = 1. She rewards the agent’s good performance
with future office. The agent’s effort in experimentation contributes to good performance.
In addition, his effort affects the learning premium which is part of the expected payoff in






























(1− γ2) = a1. (6)
The right-hand side of the above equation is the marginal cost of effort. The marginal
current return is captured in the first term in the left-hand side. The future marginal return
has two components. The first component, represented in the second term in the left-hand
side, is the marginal increase in the probability of staying in office times the expected payoff
in future office. With high-powered office incentives, good performance is rewarded with
future office. A higher expected payoff in future office provides stronger incentives to work
today. The second component, represented in the third term in the left-hand side, is the
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marginal increase in learning premium, holding the expected probability of staying in office
constant. Given high-powered office incentives, the agent also faces uncertainty in reaping
the learning premium. The uncertainty plays a larger influence on his effort decision when
the marginal learning premium is higher. Balancing the marginal cost and benefit, I derive
the agent’s equilibrium strategy in the subgame where the threshold σ = 1 as follows.
Remark 3. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σs = 1, effort in experimen-













where superscript denotes that the re-appointment provides high-powered incentives.
With high-powered office incentives, both the organizational-goal motivation and the
effectiveness of the status quo policy have positive effects on experimentation effort. Intu-
itively, an agent who is highly motivated by organizational goals works harder. But why
does an agent put more effort into experimentation if the status quo policy becomes more
effective? On the one hand, when the status quo policy becomes more effective, the learning
premium becomes smaller, and the agent’s tendency to shirk in experimentation increases.
One the other hand, when the status quo policy becomes more effective, the payoff in future
office increases, and the agent tends to work harder to attain office. Because the agent reaps
a learning premium with probability 1
2
a1, his tendency towards shirking is discounted by
1
2
a1. Overall, the agent works harder when the status quo policy is more effective.
The Principal’s Choice of Incentive Structures
As established in Equation (3), the agent’s effort in experimentation in the first period
contributes to the principal’s expected second-period payoff. Moreover, the agent’s effort
in the first period increases the probability of a good first-period policy outcome and thus
the principal’s expected first-period payoff. As a result, the principal chooses an incentive
structure that induces more effort in experimentation.
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A comparison between Equation (5) and Equation (6) demonstrates the cost and ben-
efit of high-powered office incentives. On the one hand, by rewarding good performance with
future office, high-powered office incentives motivate the agent to put effort into experimen-






a1(1−γ2)+γ2) in Equation (5). The effect
is greater when the value of future office is higher. On the other hand, high-powered office
incentives introduce uncertainty in reaping the learning premium and thus discourage effort
in policy experimentation. Given high-powered office incentives, the agent could only benefit








Provided with low-powered office incentives, the agent benefits from learning with certainty





(1 − γ2). The agent’s expected marginal learning







(1 − γ2) less than that given







(1− γ2) thus represents the cost of high-powered
incentives. As the marginal learning premium becomes greater, the cost becomes larger.
The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects the prin-
cipal’s trade-offs. When the agent places a low value on achieving organizational goals, the
agent is less motivated to exert effort. With low effort, his chance of staying in office to reap
learning benefits is low. Thus, he is more likely to hold back effort in experimentation. In
other words, the cost of high-powered incentives is larger when the agent is less motivated by
organizational goals. In addition, when effort in experimentation is low, the expected payoff
in future office is low. The motivation effect is thus small. As a result, the principal refrains
from using high-powered incentives when the agent who places a low value on achieving
organizational.
To examine formally how the agent’s organizational-goal motivation affects the princi-
pal’s choice of office incentives, I derive the difference between the equilibrium effort under
two types of incentive structures as a function of the value the agent places on achieving
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organizational goals and the effectiveness of the status quo policy.












− (1 + (1− γ2)λ
2
)))
Based on the above expression, I display the overall effect of the agent’s value of achiev-
ing organizational goals on the relative effectiveness of high-powered office incentives in Fig-
ure 1. As the level of the organizational-goal motivation increases, the relative effectiveness
of high-powered office incentives first decreases and then increases. As a result, the princi-
pal provides low-powered office incentives when the agent places a low value on achieving
organizational goals is low and high-powered office incentives when the agent places a high
value on achieving organizational. The principal’s decision about the incentive structure is












The principal chooses high-powered office incentives when the agent’s value of achieving
organizational goals is higher than a threshold, and low-powered incentives otherwise. The
threshold is decreasing in the effectiveness of the status quo policy. In other words, the
principal is more likely to introduce high-powered office incentives as the status quo policy




In a two-agent setting, policy learning depends on the agents’ joint effort. The other
agent’s effort also contributes to an agent’s future office value. If the other agent exerts more
effort, information about an experimental policy becomes better and an agent’s future office
becomes more valuable. Because of the increase in the expected payoff in future office, the
motivation of high-powered office incentives is stronger. At the same time, as the other works
harder in experimentation, an agent’s own effort becomes less crucial for policy learning, and
the marginal learning premium of an agent’s effort diminishes. If provided with high-powered
office incentives, an agent is less concerned about not reaping the informational premium.
The cost of high-powered office incentives becomes weaker. Generally speaking, the existence
of the other agent strengthens the benefit of high-powered office incentives and reduces its
cost. The principal who would have not chosen high-powered office incentives in a one-
agent environment now adopts high-powered office incentives in a two-agent case. I formally
demonstrate the above ideas in the following.
I consider symmetric strategies of two agents. It is useful to denote with a subscript −i
parameters belonging to the agent that is not Ai. I start the analysis with players’ period 2
decisions and a discussion of the learning premium. Then I derive agents’ strategies under
each incentive structure. Finally, I analyze the principal’s choice of incentive structure.
Period 2 Decisions
In the two-agent setting, the beliefs over the experimental policy’s type are updated
through policy outcomes in both jurisdictions. If xi1 = 1 or x−i1 = 1, ρ1j = 1. As long
as one jurisdiction observes a successful experiment, all players infer that the experimental
policy is an effective type. If xi1 = 0 and x−i1 = 0, for any player j, the posterior belief that
19











When experimentation in both jurisdictions fails, for each player, the posterior beliefs about
the experimental policy are less than or equal to the prior.
Based on information about the experimental policy, the derivation of the agents’ effort
choices and the principal’s policy choice resembles that in the one-agent case. If the status
quo policy is implemented, an agent in future office sets an effort level at λγ, which results
in γ2λ policy payoff in expectation. If the experimental policy is implemented, an agent
in future office exerts λρ1p level of effort and the expected policy payoff is ρ
2
1pλ. Clearly,
the principal adopts the experimental policy if her posterior belief that the experimental
policy is effective is greater than the effectiveness of the status quo policy. As long as one
district observes a successful experiment, the principal infers that the experimental policy
is an effective type. Therefore, the principal adopts the experimental policy in the second
period as long as one of the districts succeeds in experimentation, and the status quo policy
otherwise.
Remark 4. Given the outcomes of policy experimentation in period 1, P ’s period 2 policy
choice in two-agent setting is as follows.
p∗2 =

1, if xi1 = 1 or x−i1 = 1;
0, otherwise.
The Learning Premium
The agents’ effort affects information revelation and thus the learning benefit of policy
experimentation. Given the first-period effort level profile {ai1, a−i1} and the prior about
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the experimental policy, the ex ante probability of an experiment being successful is 1
2
(1 −
(1 − ai1)(1 − a−i1)). Following Remark 4, the principal adopts the experimental policy in
period 2 with an ex ante probability of 1
2
(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1)) and the status quo policy
with an ex ante probability of 1 − 1
2
(1 − (1 − ai1)(1 − a−i1)). Her expected second-period
policy payoff is
E(v(ai1, a−i1)) = λ
1
2
(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1))(1− γ2) + λγ2, (7)
where λ1
2
(1 − (1 − ai1)(1 − a−i1))(1 − γ2) is the principal’s learning premium.10 Each
agent’s effort in experimentation affects information revelation and thus the quality of policy
decision. The effect of an agent’s effort ai1 on learning premium is diminishing in the other
agent’s effort a−i1. An agent’s marginal contribution to better policy making is diminishing
in the other’s effort. As long as one experiment succeeds, an effective experimental policy
is not rejected by the principal. The more effort by the other agent, the more likely the
other agent’s experiment is successful, and the less important an agent’s own success is to
the policy making.
If an agent Ai stays in office in the second period, he also benefits from policy learning.














(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1))(1− γ2) is Ai’s learning premium. As in the one-agent case,
better information helps the principal make a better policy decision, which is also in the
interest of an agent. Based on better information, an agent can also calibrate effort better
in the second period. The other agent’s effort into experimentation contributes to policy
10The derivation resembles the one in footnote 9.
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learning and thus the value of future office; it also reduces the marginal contribution of an
agent’s effort to the policy learning.
Low-Powered Office Incentives
When provided with low-powered office incentives, Ai stays in office for two periods.
The expected payoff in future office E(w(ai1, a−i1)) depends on Ai’s effort as well as the other







ai1 − c(ai1) + E(w(ai1, a−i1))








(1− γ2)(1− a−i1) = ai1 (9)
Ai’s first-period effort increases the value of learning premium. The marginal learning





(1 − γ2)(1 − a−i1) in the first-order condition, is decreasing in
the other agent’s effort a−1i. The following remark characterizes A’s decision in the first
period, given low-powered office incentives.
Remark 5. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σ = 0, effort in experimen-












where the superscript denotes that the re-appointment rule provides low-powered office incen-
tives.
As in the one-agent setting, the organizational-goal motivation has a positive effect on
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the level of effort in experiments in the two-agent environment, and the effectiveness of the
status quo policy has a negative effect.
High-Powered Office Incentives
With high-powered office incentives, the probability of staying in office depends on an
agent’s effort ai1 in the first period. The value of future office in jurisdiction i depends on






























(1− γ2)(1− a−i1) = ai1
(10)
When the principal provides high-powered office incentives, good performance is rewarded





(1−(1−ai1)(1−a−i1))(1−γ2)+γ2). A−i’s effort contributes
to Ai’s future office value and enhances his incentives to work today. With high-powered
incentives, Ai is also concerned about not reaping the learning premium. The marginal value





(1− γ2)(1− a−i1). Because Ai balances the return and cost of his effort at
the margin, what matters is the marginal learning premium. When the marginal learning
premium is lower, the concern has less influence on an agent’s effort decision. The other’s
effort a−i1 diminishes the marginal learning premium and thus attenuates Ai’s concern.
As a−i1 increases, high-powered office incentives become more effective in inducing Ai1’s
effort. The following remark summarizes the equilibrium strategy in the subgame where the
threshold σ = 1.
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Remark 6. In the subgame where the re-appointment threshold σ = 1, effort in experimen-

















where the superscript denotes that the re-appointment provides high-powered office incentives.
In the two-agent case, both the organizational-goal motivation and the effectiveness
of the status quo policy have positive effects on an agent’s effort in experimentation. As
demonstrated in the previous section, the same result holds in the one-agent setting.
Principal’s Choice of Incentive Structures
Similar to high-powered office incentives in the one-agent case, high-powered office in-
centives have costs and benefits in motivating the agent in a two-agent case. The office






(1− (1− ai1)(1− a−i1))(1− γ2) + γ2) in equa-
tion(10). Comparing Equation (9) and Equation (10), an agent’s marginal learning premium
given high-powered office incentives is less than that given low-powered office incentives. The







(1− γ2)(1− a−i1). As the other agent’s effort in
experimentation increases, an agent’s future office value increases, and the office motivation
is stronger. Meanwhile, as the other agent puts more effort, an agent’s marginal contribution
to policy learning diminishes, and the cost is less.
How does the level of the organizational-goal motivation affect the principal’s choice of
the incentive structure in the two-agent setting? In addition to an agent’s own organizational-
goal motivation, the organizational-goal motivation of the other agent also affects the cost
and benefit of high-powered office incentives. Homogenous agents share the same level of
organizational-goal motivation. When the level of the organizational-goal motivation in-
creases, the other agent tends to put more effort as well. More effort by the other increases
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an agent’s expected payoff in future office and reduces his marginal contribution to pol-
icy learning. This strengthens the office motivation but weakens the cost of high-powered
office incentives. Formally, the effect of the organizational-goal motivation on the relative



















λ(1 + (1− γ2)λ
2
).)
Figure 3 shows how the relative effectiveness of high-powered office incentives changes
as the level of the organizational-goal motivation changes, given the effectiveness of the
status quo policy. Contrasting Figure 1 and Figure 3, I have two observations. First, similar
patterns are evident in both settings. The relationship between the relative effectiveness
of high-powered office incentives and the level of the organizational-goal motivation is U-
shaped. Second, given the same effectiveness of the status quo policy, the turning point at
which the organizational-goal motivation starts to reinforce the relative effectiveness of high-
powered office incentives is different in two settings. It is at a lower level in the two-agent
setting than that in the one-agent setting.
The following proposition characterizes the principal’s choice of the re-appointment













−9 + 2γ2 + 16γ4 − 2γ6 − 7γ8










−4− 8γ2 + 12γ4
1− γ2 − γ4 + γ6
+
−90− 142γ2 − 56γ4




Similar to the results in the one-agent setting, the principal chooses high-powered office
incentives only when the organizational-goal motivation is above a threshold. Given the same
effectiveness of the status quo policy, the threshold in the two-agent case is lower than that
in a one-agent case.
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Comparison of Incentive Structures in One-Agent Setting and Two-
Agent Setting
Figure 5 contrasts incentive structures in the one-agent setting and that in the two-
agent setting. When a status quo policy is effective, high-powered office incentives are
introduced in both settings. When a status quo policy is ineffective and policy motivation
is low, low-powered office incentives are adopted in both settings. When a status quo policy
is ineffective but policy motivation is high, high-powered office incentives are chosen in the
two-agent setting and low-powered office incentives in the one-agent setting. Unlike the one-
agent setting, high-powered office incentives also induce more effort by the other agent in
the two-agent setting, which in turn increases the expected payoff in an agent’s future office
but reduces an agent’s marginal contribution to policy learning. This increases the office
motivation and decreases the cost of high-powered office incentives. Therefore, high-powered
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office incentives are more effective in the two-agent setting. Broadly speaking, the principal
is more likely to introduce high-powered office incentives in the two-agent environment.
Applications
In this section, I discuss two main contexts in which the model applies. I begin with a
discussion of public bureaucracy reform. I then discuss how the implementation of develop-
ment programs might fit the model.
Public Bureaucracy Reform
The model casts light on issues in the design of incentives in public bureaucracies. By
focusing on office as a key incentive and the notion that agents share organizational goals,
my approach highlights the incentive issues in public bureaucracies that are different from
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those in standard private organizations.
The results developed in the model provide some insight into how to offer office in-
centives when learning is a crucial matter to the organization. Given that agents’ intrin-
sic motivation is a key reason why agents care about achieving organizational goals, this
framework implies that office incentives should vary with the degree to which agents are
intrinsically motivated. Because of this, the effect of reform of office incentives in public
sectors depends on the degree of agents’ intrinsic motivation across sectors. In the case of
the Chinese bureaucracy, the introduction of high-powered office incentives in environmental
agencies and food and drug agencies is an important issue. It is frequently suggested that
the policy outcomes are better when the careers of agents in these sectors are tied to the
policy outcomes. The model suggests that this type of high-powered incentive is effective
provided that these agents care about achieving the organizational goals. However, agents
in the Chinese bureaucracy are often rotated across different sectors, and they often do not
decide to work in a specific sector. As a result, they might not intrinsically share the goals of
a specific organization. The average level of intrinsic motivation in an organization depends
on the profile of all agents’ career paths. Without considering agents’ career paths, attempts
to introduce high-powered incentives might reduce the efficiency of these agencies.
Another aspect of public sector reform concerns competition among providers of public
goods. As Kaufman (1976) suggests, one of the threats to agencies’ survival is competition
among agencies for scarce resources. The probability of agency termination is higher when
competition among agencies for scarce resources is greatest. A similar logic could hold in the
relationship between competition among agencies and agencies’ funding. By affecting the
survival and funding of an organization, competition changes the degree to which agents care
about achieving organizational goals. The approach developed here shows how competition
complements high-powered office incentives in the case of learning. High-powered office in-
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centives are more effective when the organization faces fiercer competition. Cross-sectionally,
this approach predicts that high-powered office incentives are likely to be negatively corre-
lated with the level of learning when the intensity of competition is low and positively corre-
lated with the level of learning when the intensity of competition is high. It, therefore, seems
unsurprising that high-powered office incentives are often used in public organizations that
face fierce competition. Within the Chinese bureaucracy, for example, local governments
that face intense competition in attracting capital investment often provide high-powered
office incentives for agents working on issues of economic development. Under the current
Hukou institution which controls population movement, beneficiaries of many public goods
are less mobile. This implies a low level of competition among public goods providers across
localities. It might explain why low-powered office incentives exist in agencies such as local
environmental agencies.
Developmental Programs, NGOs and Government Agencies
It is recognized in the literature that the level of agents’ intrinsic motivation varies
between NGOs and government agencies. This difference might explain the variation in
their performance. As argued by Besley & Ghatak (2001), NGOs may find it easier to screen
on motivation than the government and they may also foster public service motivation by
providing a better match between the ends of the organization and those of its workers. The
electoral concerns of a government imply that some public servants have to carry out policies
that they do not believe in. Their public service motivation is thus undermined. Another key
issue in the performance variations between the government agencies and NGOs is that of
accountability structure. Compared with government agencies, the formal accountability of
NGOs is weak. In the context of international development projects, because of the cultural
distance between NGOs and local beneficiaries, informal accountability measures, such as
30
social sanctions and enforcement, tends to be weak in the case of NGOs.11
When explaining the performance difference between NGOs and government agencies,
the existing literature treats the effect of agents’ intrinsic motivation and the effect of ac-
countability as separate issues. In terms of the model developed here, different accountability
structures correspond to different types of office incentives. This framework thus underlines
the complementarity between intrinsic motivation and strong accountability in promoting
the performance of developmental programs.
In addition to these empirical implications, the model can also provide some insights
into issues in strengthening accountability in both NGOs and government agencies. In a set-
ting where learning is important for social service delivery, the model suggests that strong
accountability is suitable for organizations with highly-motivated agents. If it is true that
agents in NGOs are on average more motivated than government agents, strengthening ac-
countability in NGO would have a stronger positive effect on performance than strengthening
accountability in a government agency. In fact, if government agents are not well motivated
intrinsically, strengthening accountability might backfire.
When explaining the performance difference between NGOs and government agencies,
the existing literature treats the effect of agents’ intrinsic motivation and the effect of the
accountability as separate issues. In terms of the model developed here, different account-
ability structures correspond to different types of office incentives. This framework thus
underlines the complementarity between intrinsic motivation and strong accountability in
promoting performance of developmental programs.
In addition to these empirical implications, the model can also provide some insights
into issues in strengthening accountability in both NGOs and government agencies. In
11Social sanctions and enforcement play a decisive role for accountability. Miguel & Gugerty (2005)
studies how an inability to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads to collective action failures
in rural western Kenya.
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a setting where learning is important for the social service delivery, the model suggests
that strong accountability is suitable for organizations with highly-motivated agents. If
it is true that agents in NGOs are on average more motivated than government agents,
strengthening accountability in NGO would have a stronger positive effect on performance
than strengthening accountability in a government agency. In fact, if government agents are
not well motivated intrinsically, strengthening accountability might backfire.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to explore a principal’s decision about agents’ office incentives
in a setting in which agents’ effort in experimentation is crucial for policy learning. The prin-
cipal constructs office incentives to induce agents’ effort in experimentation. High-powered
office incentives link good performance to office-holding and thus motivate agents to exert
effort. At the same time, by introducing uncertainty in whether the agent could reap the
informational benefit from learning, high-powered office incentives also disincentivize effort
in experimentation. When agents are highly motivated by organizational goals, the principal
is likely to introduce high-powered office incentives. Compared with the one-agent environ-
ment, the principal is more likely to provide high-powered office incentives in the two-agent
environment.
These ideas are relevant to the discussion of organizations in which agents have a
preference for achieving organizational goals. Examples of such organizations include public
bureaucracies and NGOs. However, private firms also socialize their employees to share their
organizational goals. In future work, it would be valuable to extend this framework to such
firms, in order to understand how the interaction between organizational goals and personnel
management affects learning and innovation in the private sector.
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Appendix
The Mathematica code used for producing graphs is available upon request.
Proof. Remark 1 Solving Equation (5) gives the result in remark 1. Given the range of λ
and γ, the minimum value of al1 is 0 and its maximum value is
11
16
. Thus, al1 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Remark 2 Solving Equation (6) gives the result in remark 2. The minimum value
of ah1 is 0 and its maximum value is
22
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. Thus, ah1 ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. Remark 3 Solving equation system (7) gives the result in remark 3. The minimum
value of ali is 0 and its maximum value is
11
19
. Thus, ali ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Remark 4 Solving equation system (8) gives the result in remark 4. The minimum





5009). Thus, ahi ∈ [0, 1].




























Proof. Off Equilibrium Beliefs
A observes her own action. It is reasonable to suppose that A updates belief about
the experimental policy according to Bayes’ rule. Now consider P ’s off-equilibrium beliefs. I
prove that to sustain Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium derived in the main section no restriction
on P ’s off-equilibrium beliefs is required. In other words, given any belief that P might hold
off-equilibrium, A has no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium action.
Low-Powered Office Incentives
Consider the subgame where low-powered incentives are introduced.
Suppose A deviates to a1. Following a failure and a success, A forms correct beliefs
using Bayes’ rule as follows.
ρf1A =
.5(1− a1)
.5(1− a1) + .5
< γ
ρs1A = 1 > γ
If P forms correct beliefs, she chooses p2 = 0 following a failure and p2 = 1 following a
success. A makes a payoff of (λγ)
2
2






Now, consider the off-equilibrium beliefs for P . If a failure is observed, P ’s off-
equilibrium belief is denoted by ρf1P , and a success ρ
s
1P . To break ties, I assume that P
adopts status quo policy if her expected payoff of status quo policy equals to that of the
experimental policy. So, P chooses p2 = 1 only if her belief that the probability of the
experimental policy being effective is greater than γ. Given P ’s decision rule in period 2, I
classify P ’s off-equilibrium beliefs into four cases.
1. ρf1P ≤ γ and ρs1P > γ. P makes the same policy decision as she would have if her
beliefs are correct. Thus, A receives the same payoff in this case as the payoff he could have
received when the principal forms correct beliefs.
2. ρf1P ≤ γ and ρs1P ≤ γ. If the experiment fails, P makes the same policy decision as
she would have if her beliefs are correct. If the experiment succeeds, given the off-equilibrium
belief, P adopts the status quo policy in period 2. A knows that the experimental policy is
effective. But his judgement won’t matter because the experimental policy won’t be adopted.
A puts an effort of λγ and makes a payoff of (λγ)
2
2
. It is less than what he could have made
when the principal forms correct beliefs.
3. ρf1P > γ and ρ
s
1P > γ. If the experiment succeeds, P makes the same policy decision
as she would have if her beliefs are correct. If the experiment fails, given the off-equilibrium
belief, P adopts the experimental policy in period 2. A knows that the experimental policy
is effective with probability ρf1A, so he exerts an effort of λρ
f





A thus makes less than than what he could have when the principal forms correct beliefs.
4. ρf1P > γ and ρ
s
1P ≤ γ. P makes the opposite policy decision from what she would
have made if her beliefs are correct. It is clear that A makes less than than the payoff he
could have received when the principal forms correct belief.
I have shown that for any effort deviating from the equilibrium effort, a1 6= al1, under
any beliefs that P might hold off-equilibrium, A doesn’t make a higher payoff than the payoff
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he receives in the situation where P forms correct beliefs. Thus, I prove that given any off-
equilibrium belief of P ’s, A doesn’t receive higher payoff than she would have received in
equilibrium.
High-Powered Office Incentives
Now consider the subgame where high-powered office incentives are chosen. Use the
same proof strategy as the one in the low-powered office incentives subgame. It could be
proved that given any belief that P might hold off-equilibrium A has no incentives to de-
viate. Two things are worth mentioning. First, if the experiment fails, A makes a payoff
of 0 regardless of P ’s belief. Second, if the experiment succeeds, given A’s effort a1, the
probability that A staying office and receiving office value is 1
2
a1 regardless of P ’s belief. P ’s
off-equilibrium belief affects A’s payoff only by affecting A’s office value in period 2, which
has been discussed in subgame with low-powered office incentives.
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